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Gender and the Formal and Informal Systems of Local Public Finance in 
Sierra Leone 
 
 
Vanessa van den Boogaard 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper considers how men and women in eastern and northern Sierra Leone interact 
differently with formal and informal revenue collection. It argues that the literature on tax and 
gender equity needs to be expanded in low-income countries to pay greater attention to the 
ways that citizens pay for public services in practice. It shows that formal taxation affects a very 
small proportion of the population, and especially of the female population. The reality is that 
women primarily pay for services at the local level through informal revenue contributions, which 
has the potential to reinforce gender inequities on account of the implications for intra-household 
divisions of power and lack of associated opportunities for political representation.   
 
Keywords: tax, gender, informality, accountability. 
Vanessa van den Boogaard is a doctoral candidate at the University of Toronto.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The international community has increasingly paid attention to the importance of taxation to 
sustainable and equitable development, while recognising gender equity and women’s 
empowerment as development goals in their own right. In recent years, activists and 
policy-oriented researchers have begun to explore how tax policy and administration reform may 
serve to reinforce or address gender inequities (see e.g. Barnett  and Grown  2004; Stosky 
1997; Action Aid 2015; Huber 2005). Given that the majority of research in this area remains 
focused on issues of taxation and gender equity in high-income countries, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that policy-oriented work has tended to think about tax and gender through a 
narrow, Westernised lens, which predominately focuses on formal taxes, administration, and 
institutions. This lens is problematic as it leads us to overlook the ways in which women interact 
with tax systems in low-income countries in practice. It assumes that women do not pay 
significant amounts of tax as a corollary of maintaining less formal employment and owning less 
assets and property than men (Perrons 2015). However, this ignores the more complex 
dynamics of local public finance that affect citizens in low-income countries.  
 
In reality, very few citizens in low-income countries – whether men or women – pay taxes to the 
central government (Figure 1). In reality, rather than taxes paid to a general fund for public 
expenditures, user fees are often more central to the financing of local public goods and 
services (Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad 2018). At the same time, while formal taxation is often 
constrained, ‘local residents in many communities throughout the developing world do contribute 
substantially – outside the formal tax system – to the construction and maintenance of local 
public goods’ through what is known as informal taxation (Olken and Singhal 2011: 1). Informal 
taxes – made to state or non-state actors either in cash, in kind or through labour – contribute to 
the financing of local public goods, but are enforced outside of the formal legal system (see 
e.g. van den Boogaard, Prichard and Jibao 2018, forthcoming; Olken  and Singhal 2011). In 
practice, these payments are often necessary to access basic services, including health, 
education, and water, and can be an important means of filling the gaps left by the state or 
complementing state service provision. Given these realities, not including user fees and 
informal taxes within analyses of tax systems in low-income countries is likely to miss much of 
how local services are actually financed (van den Boogaard et al. 2018, forthcoming). Gender 
inequities are embedded within social, political and economic structures; accordingly, only 
considering formal structures – including formal government tax and the formal tax 
administration – does not capture the myriad ways that gendered power dynamics can 
permeate the processes of revenue extraction and local governance. A complete picture of the 
gendered nature of tax incidences and burdens requires that we capture taxes, user fees, and 
informal taxes. 
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Figure 1 Mean income, capital gains, and profit taxes on individuals by country income 
group, as a percentage of GDP, 1980–20151 
 
Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER, Government Revenue Dataset (GRD), 2017. 
 
While there is a growing recognition that these non-tax and informal levies are a critical aspect of 
local governance (see e.g. van den Boogaard and Prichard 2017), relatively little is known about 
their gendered incidence. At the same time, the ways in which fiscal structures may influence 
how men and women engage differently with the tax system and tax-related processes of 
representation has been insufficiently explored. Together, these omissions prevent a full 
understanding of the relationship between tax, gender, and fiscal and political equity. This paper 
addresses these gaps by considering how men and women interact differently with formal and 
informal systems of public finance. It approaches the subject through an understanding of the 
ways in which social, economic, political, and pragmatic norms interact to create complex 
institutional outcomes (see e.g. De Herdt  and Olivier de Sardan 2014a). By starting ‘from local 
realities and effective practices’ (De Herdt and Olivier de Sardan 2014b), it aims to better 
understand not only how fiscal realities differ by gender, but also how these fiscal realities relate 
to existing societal power dynamics.  
 
With these foundations, I analyse three main sources of data collected in nine chiefdom case 
studies in eastern and northern Sierra Leone.2 First, the research relies on two unique 
household surveys. The first was conducted in 2013 with over 1,100 households, capturing a 
detailed estimate of the entire range of tax and tax-like payments made to finance local public 
goods and governance structures, allowing for estimates of the corresponding rates of tax 
incidence and burdens by sex. To further explore questions around the gendered nature of 
formal and informal tax payment and the linkages to local governance processes, a further 
survey of 844 households was conducted in 2017 in the same case chiefdoms.3 This second 
survey included more detailed information about the types of payment made to access services, 
as well as information on methods of and reasons for payment of local tax, intra-household 
division of tax payments, forms of civic and state engagement, and links between tax payment 
                                                        
1  Income group of country following World Bank classification as of June 2017.  
2  Chiefdom case studies were randomly selected with probability proportional to population from three purposively selected 
districts. There are 14 districts nationwide. At the time of research, there were 149 chiefdoms; to date there are 190 districts 
as a result of de-amalgamation of chieftaincies.  
3  For both surveys, we used a clustered, multi-stage probabilistic random sample design, selecting sampling units of 
decreasing size based on population data made available by Statistics Sierra Leone. Within primary sampling units, we 
randomly selected households to be invited to participate in the survey, using defined walking paths with sampling intervals 
dependent on the estimated populations. In line with major national household surveys conducted in Sierra Leone, I define 
households as a person or group of people, related or unrelated, who live together and make shared cooking arrangements. 
Trained enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews in local languages; oral translation was used, with training focusing 
on back translation to ensure conceptual equivalence.   
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and local political accountability and representation. An additional section exploring governance 
processes within the chieftaincy was included for 112 chiefdom councillors that were randomly 
selected as part of the enumeration process. For both surveys, within each household we 
interviewed the economically active head of household.4 For the first and second surveys, 39 per 
cent and 40 per cent of the household heads interviewed, respectively, were women.5  
 
Second, to complement the survey data, I analyse qualitative data collected over eight months in 
2016 and 2017. This qualitative data is particularly important given the limitations of analysing 
tax and gender through household surveys. Namely, while gender is an individual characteristic, 
some taxes and other forms of contributions are paid at the household level. In handling the 
survey data, this paper takes the approach of previous studies in engendering household-level 
data by using gendered household categories based on the gender of the head of household 
and the proportion of male and female household members.6 While this approach is useful for 
offering a picture of the incidence of taxation, it does not tell us much about the actual 
experience of paying tax for citizens, which is better illustrated through in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions.  
 
Focus group discussions with taxpayers and local leaders offered insights into the real modes of 
tax payment and intra-household divisions in tax budgeting and engagement.7 Of particular 
importance to understanding the gender dimensions of taxation and local governance, I analyse 
a series of interviews with community, chieftaincy, and political leaders.8 Interviews with District 
Officers, the principal representatives of the central government in districts, and Central 
Chiefdom Administration Clerks, who monitor the local tax collection process for the chiefdoms 
within districts, support a deeper understanding of local tax payment processes. Interviews with 
paramount, section, and town chiefs and chiefdom councillors allowed for a deeper 
understanding of chieftaincy elections, the role of chiefs and chiefdom councillors in governance, 
and the links between payment of the local poll tax and representation. Interviews with female 
community, traditional, and political leaders helped foster greater understanding of the dynamics 
of female leaders in local governance in contemporary Sierra Leone.  
 
Finally, I corroborate and provide further illumination on reported tax incidence and local 
government revenue profiles using local government fiscal data from 2005 to 2015 provided by 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.  
 
Using this data, I first provide a brief overview of the structures of taxation and governance in 
Sierra Leone, making the case for an expanded definition of informal taxation as a result of the 
importance of user fees and informal taxes to the delivery of local services. Section 3 then 
outlines the incidence and burden of taxation by sex for national and local taxes and payments. 
This analysis shows that female-headed households pay fewer formal taxes and user fees, but 
                                                        
4  In line with the government of Sierra Leone, I define economically active head of household as ‘the person who makes 
economic decisions in the household; the breadwinner’ (GoRSL 2007b).  
5  This reflects a relatively high degree of female-headed households in areas heavily affected by the civil war, with higher 
incidence of widowhood reported amongst women relative to men, as well as different gender norms around remarriage after 
the loss of or separation from a spouse. Nationwide, 0.9 per cent of men report being widowed, relative to 7.0 per cent of 
women (SSL 2015).  
6  There are 504 male-dominated households, 465 female-dominated, and 138 with equal numbers of men and women. 
Twenty-two observations were excluded from the analysis on account of errors in reporting the number of female and male 
households members (see e.g. Grown  and Valodia 2010). 
7 With a research assistant, I conducted 34 focus group discussions in Krio in a random selection of enumeration areas. Cited 
quotes are included in English as translated by myself and/or a research assistant. Original transcriptions and quotes are 
available upon request. 
8  A research assistant and I conducted the interviews in a mix of English and Krio. Cited quotes are included in English as 
translated by myself and/or a research assistant from transcripts of digital recordings of the interviews where it was possible 
to make recordings. Original transcriptions and quotes are available upon request. 
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pay more informal taxes to access local public goods. At the same time, female-headed 
households face a higher burden of taxation for both formal and informal taxes. Section 4 
considers the implications of these findings, focusing on the impacts for intra-household 
divisions of money and power, the links between taxation and political representation, and 
taxpayer engagement with the state.  
 
2 Structures of governance and taxation in 
  Sierra Leone 
 
Institutions in Sierra Leone are built around the British system of indirect rule that delegated 
local governance to traditional rulers. Chiefs continued to dominate local governance, even after 
the British created district councils in 1945 as a counterweight to the chieftaincy. This initial 
system of local councils was abolished in 1972 by the government of Siaka Stevens, which 
centralised formal state power while allowing de facto local power to return to the increasingly 
politicised chieftaincies. The administration used the chiefdom institutions to rule ‘up country’ in a 
manner similar to under British direct rule, with chiefs remaining the primary conduit of 
governance for most people (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Tangri 1978; Reed  and Robinson 2012). 
Accordingly, the powers that chiefs had acquired during the colonial period were further 
institutionalised in the post-independence period, in a process Fanthorpe describes as ‘colonial 
ossification’ (Fanthorpe 2001). 
 
Centralisation of power at the national level in this period resulted in a deterioration in the 
provision of local services and a further politicisation of chieftaincy institutions, which in turn 
were important causes in the civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002 (Jackson 2005; SLTRC 
2004; Fanthorpe 2005; Kanu 2009; Richards 1996; Sawyer 1996). Accordingly, an ambitious 
decentralisation process, re-establishing local councils, was an immediate priority for the 
government and donors alike after the post-war elections of 2002.9 Following decentralisation, 
the central government retains few direct tax handles amongst the majority of Sierra Leoneans, 
who fall below income tax thresholds, with income, capital gains, and profit taxes on individuals 
representing an average of only 1.70 per cent of GDP from 1998 to 2015 (Figure 2)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9  The donor-sponsored Local Government Act (LGA) of 2004 defined the legal framework of decentralisation. It created five 
city councils, one municipal council, and 13 district councils, the latter of which covered the bulk of the country and were 
further divided into 149 chiefdoms, later increased to 190 chiefdoms. 
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Figure 2 Central government taxes on individuals, total taxes, and total revenues as a 
percentage of GDP, 1998–2015 
 
Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER, Government Revenue Dataset (GRD), 2017. 
 
Meanwhile, at the local government level, direct taxes on citizens also remain relatively low, 
partly as the result of continuing confusion and conflict over whether the local or chiefdom 
council is the supreme authority over citizens at this level. While the defining piece of legislation 
states that ‘A local council shall be the highest political authority in the locality’  (GoRSL 2004: 
sec.20(1)) and clearly states the local council’s role in overseeing the chiefdom councils,10 this 
authority was repeatedly disputed in interviews with chiefs and their representatives. In practice, 
the chiefdoms, though not recognised as a formal level of government, continue to exercise a 
significant degree of power over governance, service delivery, and taxation in practice (Reed 
and Robinson 2012; Casey 2007; Robinson 2008; Jibao and Prichard 2016; van den Boogaard 
et al. 2018, forthcoming).  
 
This conflict of local authority is well illustrated by looking at the most important tax at the local 
level, the local tax, which is a poll tax on all adult citizens. Since the colonial era of indirect rule, 
paramount chiefs and their subordinates were responsible for collecting these poll taxes. After 
the initial establishment of district councils in the 1970s, they retained responsibility for collecting 
local tax, though they were expected to provide a share of the tax, known as a precept, to the 
local councils. Following the second wave of decentralisation in the post-conflict period, the 
collection of local taxes continues to be carried out by chiefdom councils within each district, with 
revenue sharing and the remittance of the precept enshrined within the LGA.11  
 
Local councils are dependent on chiefs for this important source of revenue, with chiefs having 
an information advantage over the government with regard to local populations. With their 
hierarchal institutions of authority, paramount chiefs delegate the collection of population data 
and revenues to section chiefs, who in turn delegate to town chiefs, who in turn delegate to 
chiefdom councillors, each responsible for collecting the tax from just 19 other taxpayers. 
For their role in tax collection, these actors receive a locally determined rebate, which is included 
                                                        
10  ‘It shall be the function of a local council to… oversee Chiefdom Councils in the performance of functions delegated to them 
by the council’ and ‘approve the annual budgets of Chiefdom Councils and oversee[ing] the implementation of such budgets’ 
(GoRSL 2004: 20(2h) and 20(2j)). 
11  ‘Revenue raised from local taxes… shall be shared between the local councils and the Chiefdom Councils’ while ‘Local 
councils shall… determine the percentage of the local tax to be paid to it, to be called the precept, as it may by resolution 
determine and as it requires as revenue’ (GoRSL 2004: 58 and 59(1)). In practice, the proportion of the remittance depends 
on the size of the chiefdom. Class A chiefdoms are required to remit 20 per cent of revenues to the district council, Class B 
chiefdoms are required to remit 10 per cent of revenues, and Class C1 and C2 chiefdoms are required to remit five per cent 
of revenues to the council.  
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in the chief’s costs of collection and subtracted from the total used to calculate the amount of the 
precept owing to the local council. Overall, this division of collection power remains a source of 
tension between the local and chiefdom councils, with disagreements over the appropriate level 
of the precept, district councils in many cases unable to enforce the payment of the precept by 
the chiefdom council, and frequent failures by chiefdoms to remit the required revenue 
(Fanthrope 2004; Jibao and Prichard 2016). 
 
In some district councils, these tensions are playing out in the context of the introduction of 
property tax, widely seen as having the potential to be a primary source of local government 
revenue and ‘a critical component of the broader governance-enhancing objectives of 
decentralization’ (Jibao and Prichard 2015: 404; see also Bardhan 2002; Agrawal and Ribot 
1999; Faguet 2004). Despite property rates being the sole purview of the local government,12 
some district councils have blocked the local council from introducing property tax, with some 
councils even coming to informal revenue sharing agreements with chiefdoms in order to make 
collection possible. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that outside of city councils, property tax 
collection remains low (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Average city and district council revenues, 2005–15 
 
Source: Data provided by the Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.  
 
In this context of continued confusion and conflict over decentralised governance, it is 
impossible to fully understand the interaction of citizens with public finance by only looking at 
formal taxes. I thus argue that in order to understand the effective burden of financing 
government and local public goods, we need to consider the real dynamics of local public 
finance, which includes user fees and informal taxes. Formal taxes at the central or local level 
                                                        
12  The Local Government Act defines property rates as the purview of local councils, while specifying that councils only need 
share revenues from local taxes and mining revenues (GoRSL 2004: 45(4), 69, and 58).   
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have a small impact on the majority of citizens, with reported local government revenues 
amounting to only about $1 per capita (van den Boogaard  et al. 2018, forthcoming). While local 
government taxes for all district and city councils amount to an average of 0.03 per cent of GDP 
from 2005 to 2015, user fees and charges amounted to 0.04 per cent of GDP over the same 
time period, while not including the largest and most prevalent type of user fee – school fees.13 
User fees are the most widely paid levies recorded by the household survey and make up the 
largest payment type as a proportion of income (van den Boogaard et al. 2018, forthcoming). 
Indeed, user fees are an increasingly important way of financing local services that would 
otherwise be paid through taxes. As described by Joshi, with fiscal decentralisation, ‘local 
governments are increasingly expected to rely on own-source revenue for providing services, 
and user fees are a common source of such revenue’ (2017: 9).  
 
At the same time, informal ways of financing local public goods are significant, including through 
forms of self-help, community development, ‘fees charged to finance a local, non-governmental 
public good’, or ‘to provide supplemental financing to a governmental public good’ (van den 
Boogaard et al. 2018, forthcoming). As described by focus group participants, communities often 
come together to ‘tax themselves’ or ‘help themselves’ in order to help community (volunteer) 
teachers or fund community services, while often paying extra for ‘free’ public services.14 Survey 
data shows that these informal payments are significant, making up almost 33 per cent of total 
formal and informal payments as identified by taxpayers, with 69 per cent of households 
reporting having paid at least one informal tax to access a public good in the previous 12 
months.15 While some argue that some of these payments simply constitute bribes for accessing 
services, the reality is more complex. As described in greater detail elsewhere, ‘In contexts 
where salaries of local government officials are low, or not paid on time, such illegal payments 
contribute, at least in part, to financing local government salaries, or paying for government 
activities – the traditional role of taxes’ (van den Boogaard et al. 2018, forthcoming).16 In this 
view, these payments are critical aspects of how local services are provided and the local state 
is funded in practice. At the same time, the reality of ‘the fluidity – and sometimes 
interchangeability – in practice’ of formal and informal payments implies that there is value in 
capturing the entire fiscal reality facing taxpayers, as the distinction between what is formal and 
what is informal is often far from clear (van den Boogaard et al. 2018, forthcoming). Given their 
importance to local public goods provision, these informal taxes need to be included within an 
analysis of how public finance affects men and women.  
 
                                                        
13  Formal school fees, which for junior and senior secondary school range from 25,000 to 30,000 SLL ($3.26–$3.91) per term. 
14  Date and location specifications for data from interviews and focus group discussions can be provided upon request. 
15  For context, annual payments for community teachers are commonly two to three times larger than the most common and 
important formal tax (the local tax), which is 5,000 leones (US$0.65) per adult. Described in greater detail in van den 
Boogaard et al. (2018, forthcoming). 
16  Including such payments is necessary to capture what Rémy Prud’homme seminally defines as the ‘nonformal means 
utilized to finance the provision of public goods and services’  (1992: 6). 
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3 Incidence and burden of tax payment by sex  
 
With this understanding of the ongoing complexity of decentralisation in Sierra Leone and the 
importance of user fees and informal taxes to the financing of local public goods, I now assess 
gendered differences in the incidences and burdens of taxation for central government taxes, 
local government taxes, user fees, and informal taxes to access public goods. In making these 
comparisons, I take a common approach, using gendered household categories based on the 
gender of the head of the household and the proportion of male and female household 
members.  
 
3.1 Central government taxes 
 
Most of the recent focus on tax and gender in low-income countries has been framed through a 
Westernised lens focusing on taxes that are important in OECD countries, including income and 
corporate taxes, and the associated systems of filing and exemptions (see e.g. Birchall and 
Fontana 2015; Capraro 2014; Wanjala, Kirangai  and Mathenge 2006).17 These studies overlook 
the ways in which taxation operates differently in low-income countries. Despite some evidence 
from developing countries of structural bias in formal tax systems, in practice the impact of this 
bias is limited as very few people actually pay personal income tax or other central government 
taxes in sub-Saharan Africa (Grown and Valodia 2010: 1; Moore et al. 2018), with Sierra Leone 
being no exception. Indeed, while central government taxes, led by taxes on personal income, 
are significant for some high-income taxpayers in the country, they are paid by only four per cent 
of all survey respondents as most fall below relevant thresholds.18  As expected, we see that 
female-headed households pay fewer central government taxes (Figure 4). However, despite 
there being no gender inequities entrenched in policy, we unexpectedly see that of those 
households that pay personal income tax, female-headed and female-dominant households pay 
a larger proportion of tax relative to household income.   
 
                                                        
17   A further focus of exploration in this area has been on indirect taxes, especially value-added tax (VAT), which are assumed 
to have a disproportionally negative and regressive impact on women. As this paper focuses on the processes of tax 
payment as means of engagement with the state, it does not consider such indirect taxes, which are often invisible to 
taxpayers. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purported gender inequities that result from VAT are often exaggerated 
by activists, or not based on well-substantiated data. For further discussion see, for example, Joshi (2017).  
18  Indeed, only two and three respondents, respectively, reported paying corporate income and capital gains taxes. As noted, 
this discussion of central government taxes does not include indirect taxes (the good and services tax), which may be paid 
indirectly by many taxpayers, but is not captured by our survey owing to the invisibility of these payments to most taxpayers. 
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Figure 4 Incidence and burden of personal income tax  
  
  
Source: Author’s survey data. 
 
3.2 Local government taxes 
 
While much attention has been given to the explicit and implicit gender biases of central 
government taxes within analyses of tax and gender, it is also important to consider gender 
biases that may exist at the local level. In Sierra Leone, I consider the two most important taxes 
at the local level – property tax and the local (poll) tax. First, property taxes may have different 
gender impacts as a result of differential laws and norms around property ownership. In Sierra 
Leone, while the Constitution grants equal ownership rights to property (GoRSL 1991), property, 
as well as land access and family membership, is generally patrilineal.19 The law ensuring equity 
in property ownership, in fact, does not ‘apply to family property, chieftaincy property or 
community property held under customary law’ – which applies to most of the land in the districts 
outside of Freetown and its surroundings (GoRSL 2007a). While customary means of allocating 
land vary, women remain as ‘strangers’ within their marital homes or are considered property 
                                                        
19  The patrilineal system applies to most ethnic groups, though there are some exceptions, with groups in the north and west 
allowing for women to own plots of land in theory – though social norms often dictate that a woman requires her husband’s 
consent to do so  (Richards, Bah and Vincent 2004). 
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themselves, which in practice affects their right to own or inherit land.20 It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that I find higher rates of land ownership amongst male-headed households (63 per 
cent relative to 51 per cent of female-headed households), with male-headed land-owning 
households having significantly more land than female counterparts (a mean of 131 and 35 lots, 
respectively). Despite this, female-headed and female-dominant households are more likely to 
pay property tax as well as paying a greater proportion of their income in property tax (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 Incidence and burden of property tax 
 
Source: Author’s survey data. 
Second, the most prevalently paid tax, the local tax, is entrenched in a history of colonial states’ 
gendered interaction with colonial subjects. Indeed, poll taxes were a common way of funding 
colonial administrations and were commonly only imposed on men, reflecting colonial era 
gendered assumptions (and realities) about income potential and household leadership. In 
Sierra Leone, women were not considered eligible taxpayers under the Local Tax Act until 
relatively recently.21 With efforts at political and fiscal decentralisation following the civil war, 
local authorities began to collect local tax from women, though, as explained by a representative 
of the Ministry of Finance, in many areas this was not common practice until 2008. 
                                                        
20  A married woman is not entitled to manage a couple’s property because she is considered to be one of her husband’s 
possessions. Women are considered as perpetual minors and are not free to make decisions without their husband’s 
agreement’ (Action Aid 2012: 14; see also Richards et al. 2004). 
21  The Local Tax Act of 1974 specifies that ‘every adult male’ is liable to pay local tax. The earlier Local Tax Ordinance of 1955 
did include the option for females to pay the tax ‘for the purpose of obtaining registration as a voter in House of 
Representatives or Local Government elections’, though it was not mandated for all females (GoRSL 1974; GoRSL 1955). 
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Accordingly, it is not surprising that there remain lingering gendered sentiments amongst 
taxpayers with regard to the duty to pay local tax. For example, a focus group participant, 
describing a common sentiment, stated that ‘it’s man’s responsibility’ to pay the local tax, while 
women within the same focus group declared ‘let the man pay’. While there are no major 
differences in rates of payment amongst men and women, these figures belie the reality of how 
the local tax is paid by households, with male household and/or family members often taking 
responsibility for the local tax payment of women for whom they consider themselves 
responsible.22 Focus group participants described how it is common for men to pay the local tax 
for their spouses and sometimes even for other women in their families; 17.30 per cent of survey 
respondents, of which 93.10 per cent are women, reported having had someone else pay the 
local tax on their behalf, while a further 69.43 per cent, of which 76.62 per cent are men, 
reported paying the local tax on behalf of someone else.23  
 
This sense of different taxpaying responsibilities is rooted in colonial institutions of taxpaying as 
well as entrenched gender norms, as explained by a male focus group participant: ‘I pay for my 
wife because she is under me’. At the same time, a female town chief explained that it is rooted 
in the reality of economic inequities: men pay the local tax more than women because men have 
more money and economic opportunities than women. Indeed, as noted by a focus group 
participant, it may be that it is simply ‘those in a better position pay for others’, though evidently 
such logic is inextricable from gendered structures of income and production. At the same time, 
as expressed by focus group participants, it is common in some areas for a male family elder to 
take the responsibility to pay on behalf of the household, at least partially to ensure that the 
household is held in good standing within the community.  
 
                                                        
22  The second round of surveys and qualitative data collection probed the method of payment, finding that it is common for 
women to report having paid their local tax even where their spouse or a male relative outside of their household paid the tax 
on their behalf. 
23  Of the 126 women whose spouses paid for them, 86.51 per cent explained that it was simply their husband’s responsibility to 
pay for them. Likewise, of the 368 men who paid the local tax for their spouse, 66.85 per cent explained that it was simply 
their responsibility to do so. Outside of one’s duty to pay for another, other reasons reported for paying the tax for someone 
else include that person’s inability to afford it and the person being outside of the chiefdom at the time of collection.  
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Figure 6 Incidence and burden of the local tax 
 
Source: Author’s survey data. 
 
3.3 User fees and informal taxes 
 
While user fees are not typically considered within analyses of tax, they may have particularly 
significant implications for gender equity. As described by Joshi, ‘user fees can be regressive, 
and often discriminate against women and girls when imposed on basic public good such as 
health, education, water and sanitation’ (2017: 9).24 Indeed, while male-headed households are 
more likely to pay ‘formal’ user fees, they pay a smaller amount in relation to their income 
(Figure 7). 
 
                                                        
24 Moreover, in practice, where households have to pay user fees for services, rates of access for women and girls are lower 
than for men. 
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Figure 7 Incidence and burden of user fees25  
 
Source: Author’s survey data. 
At the same time, we see that female-headed households are more likely to pay more informal 
taxes to access public goods and services, while also paying a greater amount in relation to their 
income (Figure 8). At the same time, there is abundant qualitative and observational evidence 
that women play a critical role in communal-level forms of self-help and public service provision 
that involve levying informal user fees, including with respect to water well management. 
 
                                                        
25  This includes school fees, fees to health clinics, burial fees, jetty handling fees, and marriage fees.  
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Figure 8 Incidence and burden of informal taxes26  
 
Source: Author’s survey data. 
4  Implications of gendered tax incidence 
and burdens 
 
Overall, we see that while female-headed households pay fewer formal taxes and user fees, 
they pay more informal taxes to access public goods, while paying a greater proportion of their 
income in both formal and informal taxes. This reinforces the need to include user fees and 
informal taxes into analyses of the gender impact of systems of local public finance. I now briefly 
consider three possible implications of these gendered differences in tax incidences and 
burdens for intra-household divisions of power, representation within chiefdom institutions, and 
taxpayer engagement with the state. 
 
                                                        
26  This includes user fees or community development taxes paid to non-state actors, as well as informal payments to doctors 
and teachers.  
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4.1 Intra-household divisions of money and power 
 
While it is often the case that women in low-income countries pay fewer taxes than men, 
evidence suggests that women bear the brunt of payments to access public goods, even in 
male-headed households, suggesting important gender-based differences in intra-household 
budgeting. Focus group participants often noted that it is considered women’s ‘responsibility’ 
within a household to pay for expenditures that support children, such as formal and informal 
school fees. Roisin Cavanagh, manager of the Women’s Property and Land Rights project at 
Cooperazione Internazionale notes that in Sierra Leone, ‘women use the majority of their 
earnings to pay for school fees, medical bills and other basic family needs’.27 These divisions in 
intra-household budgeting may be particularly important within polygamous households, which 
make up 30 per cent of households nationwide in Sierra Leone,28 as women within such 
households ‘are expected to generate their own income and be mainly responsible for their 
children’ (McFerson 2012: 56).  
 
Nevertheless, observers may be more prone to come to these conclusions as a result of 
entrenched gendered notions about women’s inherent ‘goodness’. For example, in evaluating an 
agricultural project in Kabala, Richards et al. note that ‘it was assumed’ that women ‘would be 
more likely to use their income to support their families, but some women began to behave like 
men, reportedly abandoning children and divorcing husbands in favor of younger boyfriends’ 
(2004: 28). The complexity of observing these practices in an objective manner points to the 
need for further exploration with respect to intra-household power and budgeting and how they 
relate to the division of responsibilities of paying taxes, user fees, and informal taxes.  
 
Further research should also explore how gendered tax incidences and burdens influence 
gender inequities more broadly through existing social structures and within households. For 
instance, it is plausible to think that these differences serve to entrench gender inequities within 
households, as informal contributions often require labour (and, thus, time) in the form of 
cooking or toting water, which may further detract from women’s freedom, both economically 
and domestically. However, little remains known about these impacts, particularly as men, 
though predominately youth, also contribute labour to informal forms of taxation and community 
development. Future research would benefit from exploring in greater detail the gendered 
incidence of such contributions and the corresponding implications for the economic 
opportunities available to women.  
 
4.2 No representation without taxation? 
 
Scholars have long noted ‘the role of tax bargaining in the emergence of representative political 
institutions in early modern Europe’, reflected in the ‘well-known American revolutionary slogan 
“no taxation without representation” ’ (Prichard 2015: 1). Extending this logic to the context of 
Sierra Leone raises the question: As women pay fewer formal taxes than men, do they miss out 
on political representation?  
 
While representation at the national and local government levels is based around population, as 
is common elsewhere, representation within the chieftaincy is based around payment of the 
local (poll) tax. As defined in the Chieftaincy Act, tax payment is necessary for voting in chiefdom 
elections, with taxpayers defined as ‘a member of the chiefdom liable to local tax and in 
possession of a local tax receipt’ (GoRSL 2009: Art. 1). For the election of paramount chiefs and 
                                                        
27  Cited in IRIN (2012). 
28  Note that rates are higher in rural areas and for women (SSL 2015). 
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their subordinate section chiefs, this process happens through chiefdom councillors.29 Only 
chiefdom councillors, who must pay local tax in order to be eligible for the position (GoRSL 
2009: Art. 6.(1c)), are eligible to vote in the elections of paramount and section chiefs (GoRSL 
2009: 4(2), 6(1), 23(1)). These councillors represent 20 taxpayers (19 plus himself), and while it 
was originally mandated that taxpayers in a town would elect their representatives,30 in practice 
they are appointed by town, section or paramount chiefs.  
 
Given their power in chiefdom elections, it is notable that chiefdom councillors are predominately 
– if not universally – men. The defining piece of legislation notably refers to chiefdom councillors 
as ‘he’, though bringing in the female pronoun elsewhere to refer to positions for which females 
may be eligible (GoRSL 2009: 4(2), 6(1), 23(1)). Richards et al. note that while chiefdom 
councillors can be women, ‘the group as a whole mainly reflect[s] the interests of local land-
owning lineages’ (2004: 28), which, as described above, are dominated by men. As explained by 
a female town chief, ‘only men sell tax books’, implying that only men can be chiefdom 
councillors. She lamented this fact, explaining her belief that it was a result of men not wanting 
to share the aforementioned rebate that tax collectors receive for helping in tax collection: ‘When 
we ask them to [let us] help sell the tax [e.g. collect local tax], they don’t want to include us 
because they don’t want us to share the money [i.e. the rebate]’.31 Overall, it is not hard to see 
why, as documented by Richards et al., ‘women resented their lack of involvement in decision 
making, and especially the lack of “any significant role in [chieftaincy] elections” ’ (2004: 30).32 
 
While imperfect and variable, the importance of these indirect forms of representation is often 
underappreciated. Indeed, 24.44 per cent of survey respondents noted that one of the main 
reasons that they pay local tax is order to gain ‘[indirect] voting rights’ in chieftaincy elections or 
‘leadership rights’ (e.g. the right to stand as chiefdom councillor or chief). As described by focus 
group participants, ‘we pay local tax to have the right to chieftaincy’ and ‘to vote for chiefs’. As 
noted by Fanthorpe, ‘while rural Sierra Leone[ans] encounter many disincentives to participation 
in the formal tax system’ chieftaincy voting rights serve as ‘one perennial incentive for such 
participation’ (Fanthorpe 2004: 28). 
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that in years where there is a chieftaincy election, as described by a 
chiefdom councillor and corroborated by local government officials, people will ‘pay tax way 
more’. It was noted by a Central Chiefdom Administrative Clerk (CCAC) and other chiefdom 
officials that the process of de-amalgamation of chiefdoms – that is, the splitting of chiefdoms 
into ruling families that were previously amalgamated and forced to share power on a ‘rotational 
crowning basis’ – has a similar effect on local tax payment (GoRSL 2009: Art.6(2)). Indeed, as 
explained by the CCAC, in one chiefdom alone there was an increase in local tax payment of 
6,000 taxpayers from 2015 to 2016 ‘because Government is talking about de-amalgamating the 
chiefdoms… Because the more tax you pay, the more you get chiefdom electors [councillors].’ 
Local tax is so important to chiefdom governance that there are incentives for local chiefs to 
create fraudulent lists of eligible taxpayers in order to get more chiefdom councillors (Fanthorpe 
2004: 28), with chiefdom councillors even paying on behalf of taxpayers (real or not) to obtain or 
                                                        
29 Chiefdom councillors were formally known, and continue to be colloquially known, as tribal authorities or TAs. For the 
election of town chiefs, which are the closest to the people, the means of coming to authority differs by chiefdom. The 
Chieftaincy Act officially outlines that taxpayers may elect town chiefs ‘in accordance with the customs and traditions’ of the 
town in question, though those customs and traditions may involve election by chiefdom councillors or appointment by the 
paramount chief.  
30  1958 Directive of Minister of Local Government, cited by Fanthorpe (2004).  
31  Author interview, female town chief, Kailahun district, Sierra Leone, 31 March 2017. 
32  Citing a citizen consultation. Nevertheless, in some areas, women have influence in chiefdom elections through informal 
channels, though influence is rare and highly variable by region, influenced by different traditions related to ethnic groups 
and gender-based sodalities, or secret societies. For example, in Tonko Limba chiefdom in Kambia district, female secret 
societies ‘have even the power to decide the outcome’ of chieftaincy elections (Reed and Robinson 2013).  
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maintain the position. As explained by a chiefdom councillor, ‘At times, it’s us that pays… out of 
pocket [for other taxpayers]… Like last year, out of 19 people… I think about only six or seven 
were able to pay. I paid the rest.’33 
 
While the gendered differences in chieftaincy representation are clear, if women paid the local 
tax themselves, the situation would be unlikely to change. Firstly, chiefdom councillors’ decision 
of who to elect is more complicated than a model of direct representation, often based around 
longstanding interests of family lineages. While some chiefdom councillors described listening to 
the taxpayers they represented when voting in chiefdom elections,34 there is no expectation that 
they reflect the views of the taxpayers they officially represent. As described by a chiefdom 
councillor, ‘[chiefdom councillors] don’t tell people who they vote for – [we] don’t have to answer 
to those people [i.e. taxpayers]’.35 Other chiefdom councillors noted the closed nature of 
chieftaincy elections that prevents them from communicating with those under them, with one 
stating ‘[chieftaincy elections are] a secret something that cannot be exposed to the public’.  
 
Secondly, pressure for representation through elections is weaker than for government officials 
on account of chiefdom positions being held for life. Indeed a focus group participant stated that 
the paramount chief ‘can do a lot of bad and nothing can happen – there’s nothing we can do 
because of his tenure [for life]’. Indeed, while it is, at least theoretically, possible that taxpayers 
can remove town chiefs if ‘a majority of the taxpayers’ express their dissatisfaction (GoRSL 
2009: Art. 26(7)), only the president can remove paramount chiefs (GoRSL 2009: Art. 19). 
Likewise, while the list of taxpayers is revised every three years, it was widely agreed that the 
tenure of chiefdom councillors is, as described by one chiefdom councillor, ‘everlasting’. 
Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers to remove a chiefdom councillor that 
they feel does not represent them well. One councillor explained that his position is for life, 
‘except if the people that [you] rule as TA [chiefdom councillor] say they don’t want you. But 
even in that case… it wouldn’t be easy to do… So almost the same conditions exist for TAs [as 
for paramount chiefs, with respect to lifetime tenure].’ By contrast, chiefdom councillors can be 
removed from office by the paramount chief if they ‘do bad’ like cursing, fighting, or not going to 
development meetings. One noted that as a chiefdom councillor you ‘feel pain because they 
[paramount chiefs] can pull you’, implying that the links of accountability are upwards rather than 
down to the people. Accordingly, it is more likely that the relationship between chiefdom 
councillors and chiefdom elections reinforce lineages of power rather than reflecting true forms 
of representation. 
 
Thirdly, women face broader exclusion from representation through chiefdom governance. While 
it is possible in certain regions, particularly in Mende communities, for women to be chiefs, this is 
rare in practice (Fanthorpe 2004: 24: Richards et al. 2004).36 While women are not statutorily 
barred from standing for paramount chieftaincy, their eligibility is possible only ‘where tradition so 
specifies’ (GoRSL 2009: Art. 8(1b)), with claims of ‘tradition’ often being used to block female 
aspirants.37 At the same time, the power and decision making differs between male paramount 
                                                        
33  Author interview, chiefdom councillor, Kailahun district, Sierra Leone, 17 June 2017. 
34  One chiefdom councillor explained that, ‘because I am representing [taxpayers], if there is an election coming, I will have to 
consult them. I consult them to give [me] their mind… It is their civic right for them to choose or to tell me who they want… 
So that… I will say, okay my people say I should vote for this person, I am going to vote for this person.’ Corroborating this 
perspective, another chiefdom councillor explained, ‘I am just a representative and need to report back to them [the 
taxpayers]’, while another said that it was his responsibility to consult and communicate with taxpayers ‘because I am 
representing people, not myself’. 
35  Author interview, chiefdom councillor, Kailahun district, Sierra Leone, 13 June 2017. 
36  For an exploration of how and why the gender of traditional authorities matters to governance and women’s rights, see 
Muriaas, Wang and Benstead  (2018). 
37  A way that this happens in practice is by claiming that tradition dictates that the paramount chief be part of the Poro society 
– though, of course, as women, they cannot become members of the male society (Fofanah 2009). 
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chiefs and ‘the handful of women who have occupied the post’, with ‘important matters’ typically 
being resolved within male secret societies instead of by the female chief (McFerson 2012). As 
documented by Richards et al., women in one chiefdom saw norms as ‘paving the way for 
discrimination against women’ (2004: 30). The causes of discrimination are thus entrenched 
within the cultural traditions of the chieftaincy – though with a relatively recent history. While it is 
often assumed to be, this is not a ‘natural’ state of affairs: McFerson describes how women often 
occupied positions of power in pre-colonial times, but that ‘first the colonial experience and then 
post-independence patrimonial politics followed by the civil war severely diminished their political 
influence and participation’ (2012: 130.  
 
Despite this context of embedded inequities, the large majority of respondents reported being 
satisfied with the selection and decision-making processes of chiefdom councillors, and the 
manner of selecting chiefs (Figure 8). This contrasts with the findings of Fanthorpe, who 
captures more negative sentiments, explaining, ‘people often complained bitterly that Chiefdom 
Councillors were appointed from above rather than elected from below, and that they often 
neglected to take the views of the taxpayers they were supposed to be representing into 
consideration when voting in Paramount Chieftaincy elections or conducting other business’ 
(2004: 31). Nevertheless, it reflects broader sentiments of ordinary people toward the chieftaincy 
in the post-war period in Sierra Leone. For example, while there have been calls for reform of 
the chieftaincy, these calls have focused on making relatively small changes to increase the 
accountability of the related associations rather than for abolition of the institutions as a whole 
(Fanthorpe and Sesay 2009). This reflects continuing trust in the institutions, and acceptance of 
different modes of representation within chieftaincies (Christian Aid 2011). 
 
Figure 9 Satisfaction with chiefdom councillors and chiefdom election processes  
 
Source: Author’s survey data. 
 
4.3 Engagement with the state 
 
Apart from representation, taxation is often seen as a key means of engagement with the state 
and as a means of shaping the ties between state and society (Bräutigam 2008: 1–33; Prichard 
2015). With taxation ‘at the foundation of the relationships between governments and their 
citizens’ (Prichard 2015: 1), how does the gendered experience of taxation affect opportunities 
for engagement with government representatives? As women’s experience and engagement 
with taxation often largely takes place through informal channels in the case of Sierra Leone, are 
opportunities for engagement with the state – and thus, opportunities to build more accountable 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
… how chiefdom councillors are 
selected?
… how chiefdom councillors make 
decisions about/for the community?
… how chiefdom councillors share 
information with the community?
… the manner in which chiefs are 
selected?
Are you satisfied with...
Yes
No
Don't know
Choose not to respond
 24 
relations – correspondingly limited?  Looking only at formal channels of state engagement, the 
evidence appears to support the perspective of women having more limited engagement and 
potential influence on the state and its representatives. Women have less contact and 
engagement with government and chiefdom officials at all levels, while also reporting slightly 
lower participation in attending public meetings (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 Incidence of state engagement in previous year, by sex 
  
Source: Author’s survey data. 
 
However, the reasons for this are multifaceted. Certainly, paying fewer taxes to the government, 
including personal income tax, property tax, and local tax, implies less engagement with 
government officials. At the same time, this reflects lower levels of education and literacy 
amongst women, as well as the multiple demands put on women’s time,38 social norms that 
discourage women from taking public roles or voicing opinions in public, and men’s power over 
their wives.39 As explained by community members in a chiefdom consultation held by Richards 
et al., ‘the timetable for women’s activities is dictated by men… women are not allowed to plan 
for themselves’ (2004: 29).40 Indeed, women are considered ‘perpetual minors [under customary 
law] and are not free to make decisions without their husband’s agreement’ (Action Aid 2012: 
14);41 as explained by a female town chief, it is common for men to prevent their wives from 
attending women’s meetings. Accordingly, while women may lack direct engagement with the 
tax system and the state, there are other factors preventing them from being more engaged.  
 
At the same time, women are highly engaged in informal relations and interactions, particularly 
around public service delivery, that are often important experiences of citizenship and 
accountability. For example, women are more likely to pay school fees and informal taxes to 
support community teachers, which implies greater engagement with public school 
representatives and a corresponding ability to influence on the organisation of public education. 
                                                        
38 Richards et al. note that ‘it is almost impossible for young women to participate in meetings outside the village at any time, 
and especially during the middle of the farming season’ (2004: 42). 
39 For example, 37 per cent of married women reported that their husbands primarily made decisions regarding visits to their 
family and relatives (SSL 2008: 240).  
40 Citing a chiefdom consultation. 
41 The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission also notes that the payment of bride price confers on the husband’s 
total control over the wife as her trustee, guardian, and protector (SLTRC 2004).  
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At the same time, women are central to other forms of informal tax collection and service 
delivery, including the management of communal resources such as water, which requires 
engagement with local chiefs who are generally central to enforcing payments of such informal 
taxes. Notably, however, these channels also imply more work and greater financial burden for 
women.  
 
More broadly, women can still play important roles in local governance, with the role of Mammy 
Queen being particularly important to collective organisation, conflict resolution, and the 
maintenance of peace.42 In some areas, these leaders are called ‘female town chiefs’ and may 
be elected by female taxpayers. Nevertheless, the patriarchal nature of the chieftaincy remains 
significant to the manifestation of women’s power in practice. Female leaders themselves made 
clear that these are not the ‘real’ channels of local power. A female town chief who had been in 
the position for seven years said there are major differences in the work that male and female 
chiefs can do and explained that the women’s ‘chieftaincy doesn’t get real respect like the “real 
chief” ’. She lamented that men have ‘small respect’ for women in the chiefdom, and that female 
chiefs are excluded from the financial dealings of the chiefdom. She argued that the position of 
female town chief must be terminated, with women instead having the right to stand for the ‘real’ 
town chieftaincy. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In Sierra Leone, female-headed households pay fewer formal taxes and user fees than men, but 
more informal taxes, while having a higher burden of taxation for both formal and informal taxes. 
This has implications for how women engage with the tax system and the state through 
channels of service delivery and political representation. However, while issues of tax and local 
representation are gendered, they are also complex, with no clear policy solutions. On account 
of the underlying structures that limit female representation more broadly within local 
governance, there is nothing to suggest that formal tax payment would be linked to more 
equitable political representation.  
 
Regardless, this research has implications for how we analyse tax systems and their impacts on 
gender equity. Gender inequities are embedded within social, political, and economic structures; 
understanding these inequities thus requires looking at the full range of these structures, both 
formal and informal. In Sierra Leone, this requires a deeper look at the non-tax and informal 
ways that taxpayers contribute to public service provision at the local level. 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 Moreover, women are working to change the state of affairs, with the role of female leaders in politics increasing in recent 
years with support of local groups like 50/50 pushing for greater gender equity within central and local politics. However, 
women in politics continue to face considerable barriers, including hostility from men and women to their participation in 
politics (see e.g. J. Hoare 2009).  
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